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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RESEARCH-PLANNING, INC. 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
appellant, 
Case No. 18968 
BANK OF UTAH, 
Defendant and 
respondent 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was brought under Section 9 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 
enacted in Utah as U.C.A. § 22-1-9, infra, p. 3, to recover damages suffered when 
the defendant bank paid its customer's personal checks in excess of the available 
balance in the customer's account and applied a customer's deposit of funds, held 
by the custom er as a fiduciary for the plaintiff, to offset the bank's advances to 
the customer. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the district court without a jury. Judgment w11:, 
entered in favor of the defendant bank on the grounds (1) the bank did not have 
actual knowledge that its customer was committing a breach of his obligation as a 
fiduciary, (2) an action is done in "bad faith" under the statute when it is done 
dishonestly and (3) the plaintiff, Research-Planning, did not prove bad faith on the 
bank's part. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Research-Planning seeks the following relief on appeal: 
1. That the judgment be reversed. 
2. That judgment be ordered in favor of the plaintiff on the follow-
ing grounds: 
(a) The term "bad faith" under the statute, U.C.A. S 22-1-9, 
does not require dishonesty in fact in the sense of fraud, a high degree 
of moral guilt or evil motives. 
(b) The meaning to be given to the term "bad faith" under the 
statute is the meaning given to the same term under the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Act. 
(c) The plaintiff has met the burden of proof of "bad faith" 
under the statute. 
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STATUTE INVOLVED 
1 I .C .A. § 22-1-9, with the pertinent portions underlined, reads as follows: 
Deposits in fiduciary's personal account.-If a fiduciary 
makes a deposit in a bank to his personal credit of checks drawn 
by him upon an account in his own name as fiduciary, or of 
checks payable to him as fiduciary, or of checks drawn by him 
upon an account in the name of his principal, if he is empowered 
to draw checks thereon, or of checks payable to his principal and 
endorsed by him, if he is empowered to endorse such checks, or if 
he otherwise makes a deposit of funds held by him as fiduciary, 
the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire whether 
the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as 
fiduciary; and the bank is authorized to pay the amount of the 
deposit or any part thereof upon the personal check of the fidu-
ciary without being liable to the principal, unless the bank re-
ceives the deposit or pays the check with actual knowledge that 
the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary 
in making such deposit or in drawing such check, or with know-
ledge of such facts that its action in receiving the deposit or 
paying the check amounts to bad faith. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 6, 1980, Mr. Roger LeFevre, an officer of First Capital Mortgage 
Loan Corporation, opened a personal account of the corporation in the Eagle Gate 
branch of the bank. Mr. LeFevre was known to the assistant manager of the 
branch, Roger Barth, who had required a signature guarantee on the check Mr. 
Lefevre deposited at that time. (R. 407.)* 
Barth's duties included operations, the teller line, the new accounts desk and 
the checking department as well as making loans. (R. 406, 407 .) After the First 
Capital account was opened, Mr. Barth and Mr. LeFevre communicated with each 
* References are to the pages of the record on appeal for the reporter's 
transcript. 
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other regarding the balance in the account. In response to \'Ir. LeFevre's inquiry 
as to the balance in the account, Mr. Barth wrote to him on August 14, sayinR 
that "your account has a balance of $106,513.90. However, all of these funds are 
uncollected and no funds will be released until they are collected. • * • 
(R. 408; Ex. 7 .) One of the items in the uncollected balance was a $95,500 check 
to First Capital that was never paid. (Ex. 8; R. 409.) 
In the morning of August 19, 1980, a cashier's check for $260,000 (Ex. 3) was 
deposited in the First Capital account. (R. 359-361.) The check had been given to 
First Capital by plaintiff, Research-Planning, the day before to be held in escrow 
(Ex. 21), pursuant to a loan agreement (Ex. 2, R. 353) between Research-Planning 
and its borrower, R. K. Buie & Associates. The money was to be used by Buie at 
a real estate closing that was to take place on the 19th or soon thereafter. 
(R. 352-356.) The money was to be disbursed when fee title to the land was 
obtained by Buie (R. 372) and when First Capital's lien on the property was 
subordinated to a first deed of trust in favor of Research-Planning (R. 353-356). 
First Capital was a fiduciary for Research-Planning as to the deposit and the 
statute, U.C.A § 22-1-9, applies to the deposit of the money in the bank.* 
It was the bank's policy that all deposits of over $1,000 be reviewed. The 
$260,000 check was on Mr. Barth's desk when Steven Alder, who was a partner of 
Buie and also its lawyer, came into the bank the same morning of the 19th of 
August to "make sure the money had been deposited and to inquire into the nature 
of the deposit." (Tr. 373-375.) 
* Defendant's response to Request for Admissions Nos. 1 and 3. (Answer to 
plaintiff's third set of interrogatories and request for admissions, R. 106, 107 .) 
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During their conversation, Mr. Barth showed the $260,000 cashier's check to 
1, Alder and told him that it had been deposited in a general account and would 
r111id on a first-come, first-served basis. (R. 374-377, 430.) Mr. Alder testified 
tl1at he told Mr. Barth that the money was "for a very specific purpose. * * * 
filey are for a closing that is to be held this afternoon or possibly tomorrow that 
will involve the addition of additional funds from First Capital Mortgage &. Loan 
to this $260,000. And then that those two amounts together were to be transfer-
red to a company in Ogden-a title company for purpose of closing a real estate 
transaction. * * * I said that they were escrowed funds and that they had been 
escrowed for that purpose which was to close this real estate transaction later 
that day, hopefully." (R. 376-377.) 
Mr. Barth testified that he was told the deposit was for a specific purpose 
but not that it was for a "real estate transaction" or that it should go to a "title 
company". (R. 430, 431.) The references to a real estate transaction and a title 
company are the only conflicts in the testimony of Mr. Alder and Mr. Barth. 
When Mr. Alder asked Mr. Barth for the balance in the account, he was told 
that the information could not be given. Being bothered that the account was not 
a trust account, Mr. Alder then said to Mr. Barth, with some urgency in his voice, 
"Well, I want you to understand that if there are any draws against this check, 
that that is not to happen and to please call me." To this Mr. Barth said "Okay" 
and wrote Mr. Alder's name on the calendar on his desk. Not having a business 
card with him, Mr. Alder wrote his telephone number on the calendar. Mr. Alder 
also said, "If there are any questions or draws against this account, I would like to 
know. It's very important that this money be closed today." When Mr. Barth said 
"Okay", Mr. Alder took no further action and left the bank feeling "satisfied that 
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the money was there which was my original concern. I was also satisfied that it 
would still be there or I would hear otherwise." (R. 377, 378.) Mr. Barth testified 
that he had no reason to disbelieve Mr. Alder and thought he was telling the truth. 
(R. 429, 446.) 
The deposit of the $260,000 was a "provisional" credit to the First Capital 
account on the 19th and would not appear on the bank's computer until the 
following day. Mr. Barth was "watching" the account and acknowledged that the 
deposit could have been held in suspense "if the bank had had any reasons for 
concern about the thing * * * ." (R. 426-428.) The provisional credit given for 
the deposit to the First Capital account on the 19th was not available for 
withdrawal as of right and could have been revoked, as between the bank and First 
Capital, until the bank received a settlement for the deposit through banking 
channels. U.C.A. S 70A-4-213 (4). 
In response to a second request from Mr. Lefevre as to the balance in "his" 
account, Mr. Barth again wrote to Mr. Lefevre saying, "The balance on your 
account is currently $102,668.51. However, there is a $95,500 check being charged 
back to your account today, leaving available a balance of $7 ,168.51." (R. 408; 
Ex. 8.) Mr. Barth wrote the second letter to Mr. Lefevre because the bank had 
learned that a $95,500 check drawn on another bank and deposited in the First 
Capital account was being "returned by the bank it was drawn on" and that Mr. 
Lefevre "would not be able to have access to that fund." (R. 409, 410.) 
The knowledge that the $95,500 check was coming back resulted in a hold 
being placed on the account on the 18th or 19th of August. Two checks drawn on 
the account, one for $9,260 (Ex. 15) and one for $415.96 (Ex. 6), which were 
received on the 19th were returned the following day as having been "drawn on 
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1incollected funds". (R. 415-417, 435, 440, 442; Ex. 6.) 
Seven other checks drawn on the First Capital account, totalling $214,164.34, 
,,dP paid on the 19th. The seven checks paid on the 19th, some of them 
collection items (R. 433), were the following: a check for $80,000 to Clarence 
Samuelson (Ex. 9) and another for $27 ,500 to Natures Estates (Ex. 14), both drawn 
on August 12; a check for $10,843.46 to Alma L. and Loil R. Keiser and a check 
for $1,930.69 to R. Dean Hill and Jean 0. Hill, both drawn on August 15 (Ex. 13); 
and checks for $25,500 to National Title Guaranty (Ex. 10), $66,000 to First 
Security Bank (Ex. 11) and $2,390.19 to Bank of Utah or R. Dean Hill or Jean 0. 
Hill (Ex. 12) all of which were drawn on August 18. (R. 410-415.) The seven 
checks were paid while the "hold" was still on the account and even though the 
$260,000 deposit was only a provisional credit to the First Capital account. 
Five of the checks paid on the 19th, four by cashier's checks (Exs. 9, 10, 11 
and 12) and one by a wire transfer (Ex. 14), totalled $201,806.15. At least four of 
these payments were handled by Mr. Barth who signed three* of the cashier's 
checks and authorized the wire transfer (R. 410, 411, 415). The two other checks 
that were paid (Ex. 13) apparently came to the bank and were paid "through 
normal banking channels" without personal attention by Mr. Barth. (R. 422.) 
A second hold was placed on the account "late in the afternoon on the 19th 
• * * ." (R. 416-417, 419, 422.) Mr. Barth testified, in response to questions 
from the bank's counsel, that the second hold was placed on the account because a 
check for $250,000 was presented for payment late that afternoon. (R. 421, 434, 
* It was not possible to obtain a copy of the fourth cashier's check from the 
bank to ascertain who signed it. 
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435, 437 .) Mr. Barth also testified, in response to questions from counsel for 
Research-Planning, that the bank "had some concern with the account, the wav 
that Lefevre was handling it, there was some risk to the bank if he was at thal 
time, the bank-he was evidently writing checks that he did not have money to 
cover. * • * We had been watching the account since the bank had found out 
that the $95,500 was coming back. * • * Our concern is that the bank, myself, 
might sustain a loss. • * * Because of the way he was using the account, the 
bank might be liable for a loss." (R. 442, 443, 448, 449.) 
Because of the holds on the account, the check for $250,000 was refused and 
a check for $20,000 (Ex. 19), which was drawn on the 19th and presented after the 
3:00 o'clock p.m. cut off on that date, was not paid until August 21. (R. 420, 
421.) 
In spite of the two holds on the account, Mr. Lefevre, on August 20, was 
able to obtain a cashier's check drawn on the account and payable to himself in 
the amount of $5,000. (Ex. 17.) Mr. Barth first told Mr. Lefevre that he could 
not have the money because the account was on hold but, when Mr. Lefevre 
"forced" the matter, he received the check. (R. 419.) Thereafter, while "the hold 
was still on the account", additional checks drawn on the account were paid, to 
the extent of virtually all of the $260,000 provisional credit. (R. 420, Ex. 5.) 
Mr. Barth acknowledged that he knew that money held by an escrow agent is 
to be used for a specific purpose and not for other purposes. (R. 424, 425.) He 
said that he did not inquire whether the four large checks paid by cashier's checks 
and the wire transfer in which he had participated were connected with the real 
estate closing Mr. Alder had talked about. (R. 423, 424.) Mr. Barth acknowledged 
that he could have asked Mr. Alder "for further information, but, I didn't." (R. 
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11'1, 425.) Mr. Barth said that the presentation of the $250,000 check in the 
'nnon of the 19th made him think that he should call Mr. Alder and that he 
c,uJ intended to call Mr. Alder but he "didn't have time." Mr. Barth was also 
'going to call" Mr. Alder "on the 20th, but I didn't because of a letter we received 
from Roger Lefevre stating that no information must be given out on the ac-
count." (R. 435; Ex. 18.) 
The bank's statement of the First Capital account shows that the deposit of 
the check provided by Research-Planning was finally credited to the First Capital 
account so that no overdraft existed in the account. (Ex. 5.) 
ARGUMENT 
In addition to the liability which arises from actual knowledge, a second 
ground of liability under the statute, p. 3, arises when a bank "pays the 
amount of the deposit" of fiduciary funds or any part thereof upon the personal 
check of the fiduciary • * * with knowledge of such facts that its action in • 
paying the check amounts to bad faith." 
• • 
The district court held that "an action is done in bad faith when it is done 
dishonestly" and that Research-Planning "failed to meet the burden of proof 
required by said statute." (Conclusions of law, Nos. 2 and 3; R. 205, 206.) 
Counsel for Research-Planning conceded at the trial that there was no proof 
of bad faith in the sense of conduct characterized by fraud or complicity on the 
part of the bank in a breach of trust. If, however, "bad faith" under the statute 
does not require dishonesty in fact, then Research-Planning has proven that the 
bank acted in bad faith. 
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A BANK DOES NOT HAVE TO ACT 
DISHONESTLY TO ACT IN BAD 
FAITH UNDER THE STATUTE 
A. The term "bad faith" as it is used in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act was 
intended to have the same meaning that the term had in the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Act:-It appears that the district court's interpretation of "bad faith"-
as requiring dishonesty-was based upon its reading of this court's opinion in Sugar 
House Finance Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 21 U.2d S8, 440 P.2d 8S9 (19S8). 
The issue in that case was whether negligence absent bad faith makes for liability 
under the Act. This court noted that "bad faith" is the antithesis of good faith 
and has been defined in the cases to be when a thing is done dishonestly and not 
merely negligently. Davis v. Pennsylvania Co. For Insurance On lives, Etc., 12 
A.2d SS (Pa. 1940)". This court also noted that "bad faith" is also defined as 
"some motive of self-interest. National Casualty Co. v. Caswell & Co., 45 N.E.2d 
S98 (Ill. 1943.)" It is evident from a review of the briefs filed in Sugarhouse 
Finance Co. that this court was not provided with information concerning the 
history of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act which shows that the drafters of the Act 
did not intend dishonesty in fact to be a requirement for "bad faith" under the 
Act. 
Since the Utah statute is an enactment of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, it 
should be helpful to consider what the drafters intended the term "bad faith" to 
mean in the Act. The underlying purpose of the Act has been stated to be the 
harmonizing of the common law theory, that one deals witn a fiduciary at his 
peril, with the provisions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. Wysowatcky 
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v. Demar-Willys, 281 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1955). From the general proposition that one 
, 110 knowingly assists a fiduciary in a breach of duty is liable to the beneficial 
,,,<>r' of the fund, 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Trusts, § 309, the law had evolved to the point 
"' 1921 where the courts had held a depositary bank chargeable with constructive 
notice and the duty to make inquiry to endeavor to prevent a diversion of 
fiduciary funds. Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 
H7-480 (1921). 
Professor Scott thought the doctrine of constructive notice had been carried 
to an unreasonable extent and argued his position as follows (pp. 480-481): 
It is easy to sit down at leisure after the event and to see 
how a cautious and inquiring banker might have discovered the 
depositor's misconduct. It would not require the acumen of a 
Sherlock Holmes to follow the clues which may have been afford-
ed. But should bankers be turned into detectives in order to 
prevent depositors from acting in violation of their obligations to 
third persons? It must be remembered also that frequently all the 
clues are not known to any one employee of the bank, and that 
the facts known to any one employee are not sufficient to arouse 
suspicion. It must be remembered that the processes of receiving 
deposits and paying checks are processes in which many employees 
of the bank take each his separate part. If no one of the 
employees has knowledge of any breach of trust the bank should 
not be held liable merely because it appears that at some stage 
by piecing together all the facts known to different employees a 
breach of trust would become more or less apparent. The bank is 
in no way to blame for receiving deposits or allowing withdrawals 
merely because all the facts known to several employees would, if 
known to one employee, have aroused a suspicion of misconduct 
by the depositor. The bank it is submitted should not be liable 
unless some officer or employee had actual knowledge of the 
depositor's misconduct or knowledge of facts so clearly indicating 
such misconduct as to show that the bank was guilty of bad faith. 
Professor Scott's reference to "facts so clearly indicating such misconduct as to 
'how that the bank was guilty of bad faith" was a reference to the meaning of the 
term "bad faith" under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. 
-11-
When the First Tentative Draft of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act was presented 
to the conference on uniform laws, it contained a definition of the term "bHd 
faith" as follows: 
And a thing is done in "bad faith" when it is in fact done 
dishonestly. 
Those words were omitted from the Act by vote of the conference. Uniform Laws 
Annotated, Master Ed., Vol. 7 A, p. 130 (1978). 
What the drafters of the Uniform Act did in rejecting the proposed definition 
of "bad faith" was, in effect, to adopt Professor Scott's argument and to "borrow" 
the term, with its settled meaning, from the Uniform Negotiable instruments Act. 
Trenton Trust Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 599 S.W. 2d 481, 492 (Mo. 1980); Maryland 
Casualty Co. v. Bank of Charlotte, 340 F .2d 550, 554 (4th Cir. 1965). 
B. It is bad faith for a bank to remain passive in the face of facts clearly 
suggesting fiduciary misconduct, particularly where the bank has a monetary inter-
est in the transaction.-The term "bad faith" appears in section 56 of the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Act which, in pertinent part, is very similar to section 9 of 
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act: 
To constitute notice of infirmity in an instrument or defect 
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to 
whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the 
infirmity or defect, or knowle e of such facts that his action in 
taking the instrument amounted to bad faith. Emphasis supplied. 
The term "bad faith" is not defined in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Act but it had had a settled meaning in the law of negotiable instruments while 
that Act was in use and long before that Act was adopted. See Rightmere, 
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raith in Negotiable Paper, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 355 (1920), where the history of the 
, "' "' enrl its application in the law of negotiable instruments is discussed at 
,,_rig I IL The author of the B.rticle referred to says that the rule of "bad faith was 
firmly fixed in American jurisprudence" by the decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the case of Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343 (1857), which 
arose over an accepted and endorsed bill of exchange. In that case the Supreme 
Court rejected a jury instruction which would have defeated the title of a holder 
for value because of his want of care and caution in ascertaining the facts with 
regard to the drawer's interest in the bill and his authority to use the bill for his 
own benefit. The Goodman case established the rule that if the facts relied upon 
to discredit the title of a holder are outside of the instrument and if actual 
knowledge of the defect in title is not found, the holder recovers unless he took 
the instrument in bad faith; and willfully shutting one's eyes to the means of 
knowledge which one knows are at hand is plenary evidence of bad faith. In the 
words of the Goodman opinion (20 How. at 366-367): 
the proper inquiry is, did the party, seeking to enforce the pay-
ment, have knowledge, at the time of the transfer, of the facts 
and circumstances which impeach the title, as between the ante-
cedent parties to the instrument? and if the jury find that he did 
not, then he is entitled to recover, unless the transaction was 
attended by bad faith, even though the instrument had been lost 
or stolen. Every one must conduct himself honestly in respect to 
the antecedent parties, when he takes negotiable paper, in order 
to acquire a title which will shield him against prior equities. 
While he is not obliged to make inguiries, he must not wilfully 
shut his eyes to the means of knowledge which he knows are at 
hand * * * for the reason that such conduct whether eguivalent 
to notice or not, would be plenary evidence of bad faith. (Empha-
sis supplied.) 
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Consistent with Goodman v. Simonds, it was held by the New York Court of 
Appeals that "bad faith in taking commercial paper does not necessarily involve 
furtive motives, for it exists when the purchaser has notice of facts which, 11 
unexplained, would show that he was taking the property of one who * • * owed 
him nothing, in payment of a claim that he held against someone else." (Emphasis 
supplied.) Ward v. City Trust Co., 84 N .E. 585, 589 (N. Y. 1908). 
In the case of In re Hopper-Morgan Co., 156 Fed. 525, 530 (D.C. N.Y. 1907), 
the court observed that where a taker of a note "* * * knew, or had good reason 
to believe that [his payor] received the note from [the original payee]; and that 
[the original payee] had no right to sell it, and that the note could only be used 
as collateral, and that it was originally issued for a purpose other than to be used 
in part payment of property of any kind, * * *" that failure to make inquiry 
regarding the note was bad faith. (Emphasis supplied.) The court went on to 
observe that circumstances may be such as to impose an active duty of inquiry and 
investigation and, if such duty is not performed, it may be conclusive evidence of 
bad faith. 156 Fed. at 530. 
The willful shutting of the eyes, without any necessity for a furtive or 
dishonest motive, has been the test of "bad faith" applied by the courts under the 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act except in cases like the Davis case, supra, p. 9, where the 
courts, "smitten with the notion of symmetry in the law", have "concluded that 
bad faith, being the antonym of good faith, is an act done dishonestly." Guild v. 
First National Bank of Nevada, 553 P.2d 955, 958 (Nev. 1976). As the Nevada 
court said, at p. 958, "logic of this sort, however, is less satisfactory than 
examining the underlying purposes of the [Uniform Fiduciaries] Act in order to 
ascertain what definition of 'bad faith' best accords with the legislative intent 
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* * * ." 
fhe position of the courts that have given to the term "bad faith" in the 
,,,forrn Fiduciaries Act the same meaning that the term had under the Uniform 
'legotiable Instruments Law is summarized in the following quotation from Trenton 
frust Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 599 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Mo. 1980):* 
The Uniform Fiduciaries Act does not define "bad faith," but 
it does define "good faith." This statute provides that " [al thing 
is done 'in good faith' * * * when it is in fact done honestly, 
whether it be done negligently or not." * * * Obviously, mere 
negligence is insufficient to amount to "bad faith." However, it is 
not entirely accurate to equate "bad faith" with "dishonesty," if 
the latter term is taken to denote a high degree of moral guilt, or 
evil motives. * * * 
The term "bad faith" is borrowed from the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Act. * * * In Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 
N. Y. 61, 84 N .E. 585 (1908), the bank accepted a check drawn 
payable to a corporation in payment of a personal debt of a 
corporate executive. The court interpreted the term "bad faith" 
as it was used in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act as 
follows: 
Bad faith in taking commercial paper does not neces-
sarily involve furtive motives, for it exists when the 
purchaser has notice of facts which, if unexplained, 
would show that he was taking the property of one who 
* * * "owed him nothing, in payment of a claim that 
he held against some one else." 
* * * The test of "bad faith" under the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Act has been said to be whether it is commercially 
unjustifiable for the person accepting a negotiable instrument to 
disregard and refuse to learn facts readily available. Where the 
circumstances suggestive of the fiduciary's breach become suffi-
ciently obvious it is "bad faith" to remain passive. * * * 
* Many of the cases cited are omitted from the lengthy summary for sake of 
tJrevity. 
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In Davis v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and 
Granting Annuities, 337 Pa. 456, 12 A.2d 66 (1940), the court 
inquired in the proper construction of the term "bad faith" as it 
used in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act: 
At what point does negligence cease and bad faith 
begin? The distinction between them is that bad faith, 
or dishonesty is, unlike negligence, wilful. The mere 
failure to make inquiry, even though there be suspi-
cious circumstances, does not constitute bad faith. 
(Union Bank &. Trust Co. v. Girard Trust Co., 307 Pa. 
488, 500, 501, 161 A. 865), unless such failure is due to 
the deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a 
belief or fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or 
defect in the transaction,-that is to say, where there 
is an intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the 
ears. 
* * * 
If "bad faith" requires conduct that is in fact dishonest, there would be no 
reason for the second ground of liability under section 9 of the Act, since a bank 
that acted dishonestly with fiduciary funds would be liable in any event. 
More than any other single factor, the existence of a monetary interest on a 
bank's part coupled with reason to suspect a misappropriation has been held to be 
proof of bad faith under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Many cases on this aspect 
of "bad faith" are cited and summarized in the Trenton opinion as follows (599 
S.W.2d at 493):* 
The fact that one dealing with a fiduciary benefits finan-
cially from the transaction is a factor to be considered in deter-
mining whether he acted in bad faith under the Uniform Fiduciar-
ies Act. Where a bank engages in transactions with a fiduciary 
and has "both reason to suspect a misappropriation by a fiduciary 
and a monetary interest in the continuance of such activity," the 
• Citations omitted. 
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bank acts in bad faith. * * * Both Southern Agency, 452 S.W.2d 
at 103, and Cassel v. Mercantile Trust Co., 393 S. W .2d 433, 438 
(Mo. 1965) suggest that if the banks had "benefited from the 
proceeds" of the fiduciary's misappropriation or "received any of 
the fruits" thereof, the banks could have been held liable to the 
principal even absent actual knowledge of a breach of fiduciary 
obligation. Accord, General Insurance Co. v. Commerce Bank of 
St. Charles, 505 S. W .2d 454, 457 (Mo. App. 1974). See Lucas v. 
Central Missouri Trust Co., 350 Mo. 593, 166 S.W.2d 1053, 1058 
(1942), which states that a bank "may incur liability and be 
compelled to make good deposits by a fiduciary * * * by approp-
riating the fund, either with or without the fiduciary's consent, to 
the payment of the latter's debt to the bank." 
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that proof of "bad faith" under the 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act requires only proof that the bank remained passive, 
disregarding the means of knowledge, in the face of facts clearly suggesting 
fiduciary misconduct. Where the bank has a monetary interest in the transaction, 
that fact must be considered in determining whether the bank willfully closed its 
eyes in bad faith under the Act. 
II 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE 
BANK ACTED IN BAD FAITH 
This is not the "frequent" case Professor Scott wrote of, supra, p. 11, where 
"many employees of a bank take each his part" in the "receiving of deposits and 
paying checks" and all of the facts "are not known to any one employee of the 
bank." ln this case, the assistant manager, whose duties included the new accounts 
desk, the teller line, the checking department and operations, knew the following 
facts and was personally involved in the following activities concerning the ac-
count: 
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1. The account was only thirteen days old. (Ex. 5.) 
2. In that short period of time the account was being "watched". Of 
four checks presented before August 19 (three on the 13th and one on the 
14th) two had been refused because drawn on uncollected funds.* 
3. The customer was told that the account had a large amount of 
uncollected funds and that the available balance on August 19 was less than 
$8,000. (R. 408, 428; Exs. 7, 8.) 
4. A check deposited in the account for $95,500 was being returned 
by the bank it was drawn on. (R. 409, 410.) 
5. A "hold" on the account on the 19th of August, which was effec-
tive to stop the payment of two checks received evidently in the normal 
course of business (Eics. 15, 16; R. 415-517, 435, 440, 442), was ignored when 
checks totalling $201,806.15 were paid that day by the assistant manager (R. 
410-417). 
6. A second "hold" was placed on the account on the same day. The 
"holds" were used as authority to deny an officer of the customer a cashier's 
check to himself-until he "forced" the matter. (R. 416, 419, 422.) 
7. Information was given to Mr. Barth that the deposit of $260,000 
and additional funds was to go for a specific purpose. This was believed by 
the assistant manager who also knew that the available balance in the 
account was less than $8,000. (R. 374-377, 408, 430-431; Ex. 8.) 
8. The four checks paid by the assistant manager were all drawn 
* See Ex. 6, a list of the activities account showing checks paid and refused. 
(R. 407.) The four checks were for $331.27, $574.12, $348.12 and $5,000.00. The 
last two were refused. 
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before August 19 and each was payable to a different person. (Exs. 9, 10, 
I I 12, 14.) 
9. Mr. Barth was "concerned" with the way the account was being 
used. He thought checks were being written on the account that were not 
covered and that the bank might sustain a loss. (R. 442, 443, 448, 449.) 
10. Mr. Barth thought he should call Mr. Alder and intended to call 
him on August 19 and on August 20 for further information, but did not. (R. 
425, 435, 446.) 
Mr. Barth believed what Mr. Alder told him (R. 429, 446) and heard all of 
:vlr. Alder's testimony at the trial. Mr. Barth did not deny that he was told that 
the $260,000 with "additional funds" was for a "specific purpose" as testified to by 
:vlr. Alder. Mr. Barth did not deny that he was told the deposit was held in escrow 
by the bank's customer, that he had Mr. Alder's telephone number and that he said 
he would call Mr. Alder if there were any questions or draws on the account. 
All of the foregoing facts show a closely watched, troubled account, the 
receipt of a single deposit of funds held in escrow or, at least, intended for a 
specific purpose, virtually all of which was used by the bank to effect the payment 
of checks payable to different parties and, most of them, drawn before the deposit 
was made. All of the facts were known to one person who was an officer with 
broad authority in the bank. 
The circumstances of this case present a clear example of a willful disregard 
of available information. Mr. Barth thought on the 19th and again on the 20th 
that he should call Mr. Alder for "further information" and intended to do so but 
did not. (R. 425, 435, 446.) Certainly the bank had "notice of facts which, if 
unexplained, would show" Ward v. City Trust Co., supra, p. 143, that the $260,000 
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deposit was to be used for a specific "purpose", In re Hopper-Morgan Co., supra. 
p. 145 other than the payment of checks already drawn and presented to the bank, 
supra, p. 7, and a cashier's check to '.Vlr. LeFevre, supra, p. 8-9. Clearly, '.Vlr 
Barth had enough information to warrant further inquiry and the "means of 
knowledge which he" knew were "at hand". His failure "to take any steps to see if 
[the checks] were connected with the 'specific purpose"', it is submitted, was 
"plenary evidence of bad faith". Goodman v. Simonds, supra, p. 14. 
There is further reason to conclude that the bank acted in bad faith. A 
telephone call to Mr. Alder would not have been in the bank's interest if it did not 
want to look to First Capital for repayment of the advances it had made on the 
19th and 20th of August. If Mr. LeFevre "was writing checks that he did not have 
money to cover", someone would "sustain a loss". (R. 442, 443, 448, 449.) If what 
Mr. Alder said was true, the $260,000 deposit was not intended to cover the 
advances. The use of the deposit to satisfy the advances served to eliminate its 
customer's debt to the bank and was, therefore, a direct financial benefit to the 
bank. This benefit the bank took to itself without any inquiry to Mr. Alder from 
whom the bank could only have learned that the deposit was not the customer's to 
use for its own purposes, least of all to pay a debt to the bank. 
The "provisional" credit of the $260,000 deposit to the First Capital account 
could have been left in that status or "held in suspense" as Mr. Barth testified if 
there had been "any reason for concern". (R. 427, 428.) If the bank should argue 
that it would be liable to its customer if it did not pay the checks immediately, 
such is not the case. The bank returned four checks (one on the 14th, one on the 
18th and two on the 19th) and delayed payment on a fifth check from the 19th to 
the 21st without liability. The provisional credit was not available "for withdrawal 
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as of right" to the customer on the 19th and could have been revoked until the 
;ettlement as between the banks involved had become final. U.C.A. § 70A-4-213 
11 ('1J It is submitted that what occurred was a decision, to borrow Mr. Barth's 
"!urds, "to make sure that the bank was not going to end up in a negative balance 
situation." (R. 420.) 
The bank's decision to take advantage of the $260,000 deposit rather than 
charge a large overdraft to its customer's account to cover the advances of the 
19th and 20th, coupled with all of the facts known to one officer of the bank, and 
the unused opportunity to learn more is proof that the bank acted out of self 
interest and, therefore, in bad faith with respect to the deposit. 
The bank was not an impartial observer. It is not being faulted for having 
made the wrong choice between its customer and a third party in the handling of 
an account where there were sufficient funds to protect the bank. In this case, 
the bank was at risk. In that position, with information available, the bank could 
not close its eyes and act in good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment should be reversed and the case 
should be remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
Respectfully, submitted, 
BEESLEY, SPENCER&. FAIRCLOUGH 
Claron C. Spencer 
Keith W. Meade 
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